Ruhr-Uni-Bochum

Low-Latency Keccak at any Arbitrary Order

2021

Konferenz / Medium

Autor*innen

Zarei, Sara Salarifard, Raziye Soleimany, Hadi Moradi, Amir Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Aein

Research Hub

Research Hub B: Eingebettete Sicherheit

Research Challenges

RC 6: Next-Generation Implementation Security

Abstract

Correct application of masking on hardware implementation of cryptographic
primitives necessitates the instantiation of registers in order to achieve
the non-completeness (commonly said to stop the propagation of glitches). This
sometimes leads to a high latency overhead, making the implementation not necessarily
suitable for the underlying application. As a concrete example, this holds for
Keccak. Application of d + 1 Domain Oriented Masking (DOM) on a round-based
implementation of Keccak leads to the introduction of two register stages per round,
i.e., two times higher latency. On the other hand, Rhythmic-Keccak, introduced
in CHES 2018, unrolls two rounds to half the latency compared to an unprotected
ordinary round-based implementation. To that end, td + 1 masking is used which
requires a notable area, and – apart from the difficulty to construct – its extension to
higher orders seems beyond the bounds of feasibility.
In this paper, we focus on d + 1 masking and introduce a methodology which enables
us to stay with the latency of an unprotected round-based implementation, i.e., one
register stage per round. While being secure under glitch-extended probing model,
we provide a general design where the desired security order can be easily adjusted
without any effect on the above-given latency. Compared to the Rhythmic-Keccak,
the synthesis results show that our first-order design is able to accomplish the entire
operations of Keccak-f[200] in the same period of time while decreasing the area by
74.5%. Notably, our implementations achieve around 30% less delay compared to the
corresponding original DOM-Keccak designs.

Tags

Hardware Implementation
Implementation Attacks