Ruhr-Uni-Bochum

Detectability of Denial-of-Service Attacks on Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum Channels

2021

Konferenz / Medium

Autor*innen

Minglai Cai Rafael Schaefer Holger Boche Harold Vincent Poor

Research Hub

Research Hub A: Kryptographie der Zukunft
Research Hub B: Eingebettete Sicherheit

Research Challenges

RC 2: Quantum-Resistant Cryptography
RC 5: Physical-Layer Security

Abstract

Communication systems are subject to adversarial attacks since malevolent adversaries might harm and disrupt legitimate transmissions intentionally. Of particular interest in this paper are so-called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which the jammer completely prevents any transmission. Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels, providing a suitable model to capture the jamming attacks of interest, are studied. Algorithmic detection frameworks are developed based on Turing machines and also Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) machines, where the latter can process and store arbitrary real numbers. It is shown that Turing machines are not capable of detecting DoS attacks. However, BSS machines are capable thereof implying that real number signal processing enables the algorithmic detection of DoS attacks.

Tags

Complexity Theory
Coding Theory
Implementation Attacks
Information Theory
Post-Quantum Cryptography